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Abstract
This paper proposes a general incomplete information framework for studying be-
havior in strategic games with stepwise (viz. `level-k' or `cognitive hierarchy') thinking,
which has been found to describe strategic behavior well in experiments involving play-
ers' initial responses to games. It is shown that there exist coherent stepwise beliefs,
implied by step types, that have the potential to encode all relevant information. In
the structure of stepwise beliefs, players are unaware of opponents doing at least as
much thinking as themselves. As a result, there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
strategy prole in which any player at some step xes the best responses of opponents
at lower steps and then best responds herself.
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11 Introduction
The emergence of strategic (or non-cooperative) games has had a profound eect on eco-
nomic theory. In these games it is, in general, assumed that when players strategize they
correctly predict opponents' behavior and, by rationality, their actions in equilibrium must
be best responses to opponents' actions. Despite the apparent success of strategic games, a
large body of experimental research has come to question players' ability to make such ac-
curate predictions in `initial response games' (viz. games without learning, feedback or clear
precedence).1 One idea that has emerged from this research is that when players strategize,
they think in steps: some players are nonstrategic and do not best respond (step 0), while
others believe that their opponents are nonstrategic when they best respond (step 1), and
yet others believe that they play against some distribution of opponents thinking in step 0
and step 1 when they best respond (step 2), and so on. The specication of steps of thinking
typically assumes that step k thinkers know opponents think in k 1 steps (viz. level-k mod-
els), or believe that opponents think in k   1 or fewer steps with a frequency described by
the Poisson distribution (viz. cognitive hierarchy models). The population of step thinkers
in initial response games tend to be stable with most weight on step 1 and 2{regardless of
the specication.
This paper proposes a general incomplete information framework for studying strategic
games in which players, who think in steps, might have dierent information about the
payo relevant parameters. In doing so we take on a view of irrationality that is somehow
dierent from what is conventional.2 Here nonstrategic players are assumed to have well-
dened beliefs, but fail to payo maximize because they are unaware of the payo relevant
parameters. While strategic players are aware of the payo relevant parameters, but are in
general unaware of others doing at least as much thinking as themselves. Such a description
does not concur with the standard belief system, as proposed by Harsanyi (1967{68) and
constructed by Mertens and Zamir (1985), since it assumes that all players have beliefs
about the payo relevant parameters , beliefs about opponents' beliefs about , beliefs
about opponents' beliefs about their beliefs about , and so on ad innitum.3 If all players
1The experimental literature was initiated by Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) and Nagel (1995), and
further developed and applied by Ho et al. (1998), Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), Bosch-Domenech et al. (2002),
Camerer et al. (2004), Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), Crawford and Iriberri (2007b) and Crawford and
Iriberri (2007a).
2Irrationality has typically been modeled as players' inability to payo maximize (Aumann, 1992, 1997).
It is assumed that players have well-dened probabilities over opponents' actions, yet it is permitted that
players sometimes fail to maximize these payos. However, this raises a diculty since subjective proba-
bilities are usually dened via payo maximization (Savage, 1954); non-maximizers of payos do not have
probabilities.
3See also Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), Heifetz (1993), Mertens et al. (1994), and Heifetz and Samet
2form such beliefs in the innite, then the belief system is by construction commonly known.
This observation motivates a reconsideration of how players thinking in steps form beliefs
about each other.
The explicit description of the stepwise belief system begins with step 0 in which players
are nonstrategic and unaware of the payo relevant parameters, such that beliefs are dened
on the empty set. The next step of thinking (step 1) is a bit more sophisticated, here beliefs
are about  and opponents' nonstrategic beliefs. In step 2 players form beliefs about , about
opponents possible nonstrategic beliefs, and opponents' beliefs about  and their opponents
nonstrategic beliefs, and so on. Explicitly describing `epistemic' step types as interactive
belief systems ensures that beliefs are constructed solely in terms . Such a specication
tells us what all stepwise belief congurations should look like. However, the disadvantage is
that the entangled web of increasing steps of beliefs makes practical applications increasingly
complex.
If we assume that players' stepwise belief system at each step can be summarize by a
single entity, their step type, then the modeling becomes more `manageable'. However, by
introducing such step types it seems that a second `level' of beliefs is required, wherein each
player has beliefs over opponents' step types, over opponents' beliefs over their step type, and
so on. Such beliefs about opponents' step types obtains naturally for any nite step type.
The notion of a `omniscient' player thinking in all stepwise belief congurations is however
in this case not well dene. Only considering nite step types may therefore be restrictive
in the following sense: by modeling a specic strategic game with incomplete information
using only nite step types we may miss some step types that are not present in the beliefs
of a nite stepwise thinker, and can be found only in some higher step. If this is true for
any nite step type, then the concept of step types is necessarily restrictive.
Our construction of innite step types has two stages. First, it is shown that each coher-
ent step type{compromising an explicit description{denes, in a natural way, a probability
measure over the set of opponents' coherent lower step types, which can be extended to a
unique probability measure associated with the innite step type. (Coherency requires that
a players' beliefs at dierent steps do not contradict each other{see Denition 1). This result
(Proposition 1) is obtained in the broadest and most natural setup, that of probability (or
measure) theory. Second, the model of stepwise beliefs is closed at each step by imposing,
via a simple inductive denition, the requirement that each step type knows (belief with
probability one) that opponents' lower step types are coherent, that each of these step types
(1998).
3know that each of their opponents' lower step types are coherent, and so on. That is, the
model is closed at each step by imposing stepwise mutual knowledge of coherency. Common
knowledge is reached in the unrestricted situation where all players think in innite steps.
Related to this observation is Strzalecki (2009) who shows how stepwise thinking, when play-
ers put less weight on the types immediately below them as they think in more steps, can
mitigate the discontinuity of predictions made by solution concepts when mutual knowledge
comes close to common knowledge.4
To formalize the idea that there is noting intrinsically restrictive about the structure
of stepwise thinking, the existence of a `universal' step type that contains all step types is
proven in Proposition 2. The existence of a universal step type guarantees that in principle
any strategic game with incomplete information can be modeled using step types without
any loss of generality. In most applications it is however convenient to use a smaller step
type spaces than that implied by the universal step type space. A smaller set of step types
which denes the strategic situation without loss of generality is therefore needed. For this
purpose belief closed subsets are dened{see Denition 2. Belief closed subsets imply that
when we choose only to consider a subset of players' step types, we also implicitly assume
that all beliefs that are relevant for each player in a given strategic situation are included.
Having completed the construction of step types in Section 2, the idea of cognitive lim-
itations is introduced. The reason for considering cognitive limitations is often justied by
arguing that the brain has limits, and that it does not understand its own limitations.5 Such
an assumption imply that players are unaware of opponents doing at least as much thinking.
However, conventional models of level-k and cognitive hierarchy thinking represent players'
cognitive limitations by assuming that they believe that the event that opponents think in
at least as many steps occurs with probability zero. Such an assumption lacks transparency:
if players assigns probability zero to an event, then it is not clear whether they do so because
they are unaware of the event, or because they are aware of the event but assigns probabil-
ity zero to it occurring. The latter is not compatible with the common notion of cognitive
limitations. The point made in Section 3 is that a nontrivial notion of unawareness (Dekel
et al., 1998; Modica and Rustichini, 1999), which does not imply modeling unawareness as
zero probability events, naturally obtains in the denition of step types{see Proposition 3.6
4The quintessential illustration of such discontinuity is the email game of Rubinstein (1989), see Monderer
and Samet (1989) and Dekel et al. (2006) for treatments developed in response to the email.
5Cognitive limitations have been studied (and found) in strategic games using selfreports, tests of mem-
ory, response times, measures of eye gaze and attention (Camerer et al., 1994; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001),
and even brain imaging (Camerer et al., 2005).
6Many dierent ways of modeling unawareness have been suggested, see for example, Fagin and Halpern
4Given the characterization of the stepwise belief system, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for
games with stepwise thinking is proposed and its existence is proven for any nite game. From
the denition of step types in the previous sections it may not be clear how one can analyze
stepwise thinking using the standard tools of game theory. Section 4 starts by clarifying this
relation. Thereafter a game with stepwise thinking is dened as a nite sequence of step k  1
games, each describing a strategic situation at dierent steps of thinking. The step 0 game
in which only nonstrategic players play against each other is omitted for obvious reasons.
However, players thinking in more steps still take the nonstrategic players into account, since
the actions of the nonstrategic players inuence their expected payos. Because players
are unaware of any situation which involves opponents doing at least as much thinking
as themselves, they believe that the step k game they are conned to is the `true' game,
and does not change their beliefs in step games that demand more thinking than they are
capable of. This implies that there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy in the game
with stepwise thinking in which players in any step k game x the equilibrium strategies
of opponents, who they belief do less thinking and thus are conned to some step l < k
game, and then choose their equilibrium based on this belief (Proposition 4 and 5). This
observation suggest a procedure for constructing a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a game with
stepwise thinking; rst we have to nd an equilibrium in the step 0 game and then extend it
step-by-step to `higher' step games by xing the equilibrium strategies of opponents in the
respective `lower' step games.
Finally, it it worth noticing that there exists a complementary literature which assumes
that players can comprehend innite hierarchies of beliefs (implicitly given by their types),
but make systematic mistakes in equilibrium conjectures (rst-order beliefs). For example,
Eyster and Rabin (2005) propose a `cursed' equilibrium where players have correct beliefs
about the joint distribution of types, and also have correct beliefs about the aggregated
distribution of opponents' play, conditional on each of their own types. However, instead
of playing best response to the actual opponents' actions, each player chooses the best
response to a convex combination of the actual actions and the aggregate distribution. Jehiel
and Koessler (2008), building on Jehiel (2005), consider the `analogy-based' equilibrium in
which players group opponents' actions into analogy classes, with the player believing that
actions in a given class are identical. Given this, the player's beliefs must correspond to
the aggregate distribution of play across actions in an analogy class. However, in these
`behavioral' equilibrium models it is not obvious why it is fair to assume that players are
(1988), Modica and Rustichini (1999), Halpern (2001) and Heifetz et al. (2006). The relation between these
models are understood from Halpern and R^ ego (2008) and Heifetz et al. (2008). The notion of unawareness
used in this paper is closest to that of Heifetz et al. (2009).
5sophisticated enough to consider innite hierarchies of beliefs and at the same time fail to
reason about rst-order equilibrium beliefs.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Step types structures are constructed in Section
2. Section 3 shows why cognitive limitations induces a non-trivial notion of unawareness.
Bayesian games with stepwise thinking and the associated Bayesian Nash equilibrium are
developed in Section 4. Concluding remarks are made in Section 5, and proofs that does not
appear in the paper can be found in Appendix A.
2 Construction of step types
In this section step k types are constructed. We begin with some mathematical preliminaries
(2.1). Then the notion of a stepwise beliefs, coherency and mutual coherency are given (2.2-
2.3), it is shown that the innite step type is `universal', and belief closed subspaces are
dened (2.4).
2.1 Preliminaries
For a given topology space X and associated Borel sigma-algebra BX, let (X) be the
set of Borel probability measures  : BX ! [0;1] on (X;BX). A class BX of subsets
of X is a Borel sigma-algebra if it contains X itself and is closed under the formation of
complements and countable unions. An element  2 (X) satises (;) = 0, (X) = 1,





=1 A. The triplet (X;BX;) is a probability space. the support
supp() = fx 2 X : (x) > 0g is a set of points with positive probability, and the marginal
of a measure  on some set A 2 BX is denoted margA = .
2.2 Stepwise beliefs
Let N = f1;:::;ng players face a sequence  i 2 Nnfig of opponents in a strategic game. In a
n-player game of incomplete information the crucial elements governing strategic interaction{
such as individual feasibility constraints, how actions are mapped into consequences and
individual preferences over consequences{are represented by a vector of payo relevant pa-
rameters  which is (partially) unknown to some players. For the sake of simplicity, let us
assume that  in the nite set  determines the shape of each player's payo function. The
form of the parametric payo functions ui(;){or, more generally, the form of the mapping
associating each conceivable parameter  to the `true' (but unknown) game G(){is assumed
6common knowledge. We may adopt a Bayesian approach by assuming that a player who
has only partial knowledge about the payo relevant parameters has some beliefs about the
parameters which he does not know or he is uncertain about. However, unlike in a problem
which involves a single decision maker, this is not enough in an interactive situation: as the
decisions of other players are relevant, so are their beliefs, since they aect their decisions.
Thus a player must have beliefs about the beliefs of other players. For the same reason, a
player needs beliefs about the beliefs of other players about his beliefs and so on. In princi-
ple, a complete description of every relevant attribution of a player should include, not only
her payo relevant parameters, but also her epistemic type{that is, an innite hierarchy of
beliefs.
Stepwise beliefs are related to, but dierent from Harsanyi's beliefs. In particular, we
assume that the nonsophisticated players are unaware of the payo relevant parameters,
while the sophisticated players have limited cognitive abilities in the sense that they do not
believe that others think in at least as many steps as themselves. The iterated process of
stepwise thinking begins with step 0 in which players are nonstrategic and beliefs are dened
on the empty set. Players doing one or more steps of thinking are assumed strategic. In step
1 players think about the strategic situation  and opponents' beliefs in step 0. In step 2
players think about  and opponents' possible nonstrategic beliefs 0 and their beliefs about
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for all k  1;
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An epistemic step k type tk
i is just a belief in step k; tk
i =  2 (Xk
i ). Let T k
0;i = (Xk
i )
denote the set of all possible step k types of player i. Similar for  i. This characterization
is explicit because it species the whole hierarchy of stepwise thinking.
By casual observation it seems that a second `level' of step beliefs is required, wherein
player i has beliefs over opponents' step types, over opponents' beliefs over her own step
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This characterization of stepwise thinking introduce a step type space, which provides
an implicit description of step types. Each point in the step type space is associated with a
payo relevant parameter, as well as opponents' belief at lower steps. A players' step type is
thus an implicit description her beliefs about such points. This does however not necessarily
mean that beliefs are well dened. The conditions under which the specication of beliefs is
meaningful is dened next.
2.3 Coherent stepwise thinking
The step k types just constructed may not be meaningful. For example, if t1
i 2 T 1
0;i, then for
this to describe meaningful beliefs of player i (or  i), the marginal distribution of t1
i on X0
i
must coincide with t0
i 2 (X0
i ). We therefore impose that the various step k types cannot
contradict each other. In other words, dierent step k types should be coherent.
Denition 1. A step k type tk
i 2 T k








1;i denote the set of all coherent step k types belonging to player i. The following
proposition shows that a coherent innite step type exists and induces a belief over  and
the space of all possible step types of opponents.
Proposition 1. For any i 2 N there exists an coherent innite step type t1
i 2 T 1
1;i which
closes the hierarchy of stepwise thinking such that
T
1





Proof of Proposition 1 follows naturally from the following Lemma, which itself is essen-
tially an adaptation of Kolmogorov's Extension Theorem due to Bochner (1960).
7What is here called coherency is usually refered to as (Kolmogorov) consistency. The term coherency
is used to avoid confusion with Harsanyi's use of consistency, which means something dierent.
8Lemma 1. Let fBZkg1
k=0 be an increasing sequence of Borel sigma-algebras on Z0  Z1 
. If each probability measure k on BZk is coherent such that
margZ0[[Zk 1
k = 
k 1 for all k  1;
then there exists a unique extension of the sequence f0;1;:::g to  on ([1
k=0BZk) satis-
fying margZ0[[Zk = k for all k  0.
Proof. Let Z = [1
k=0Zk and BZ = [1
k=0BZk be the corresponding collection of Borel sigma-
algebras (note that ;;Z 2 BZ).
Dene a measure  on the eld BZ by (E) = k(E) for E 2 BZk. Coherency guarantees
that this is well dened. Now note that  is nonnegative and (Xk) = k(Xk) = 1 for all
k  0 (viz.  is a probability measure on each BZk).
First we proof that  is nitely additive.  is nitely additive, for if a nite collection of
sets belongs to BZ, then since fBZkg is an increasing sequence of sigma-algebras, there is
some k for which every member of the collection belongs to BZk. Consequently their union
also belongs to BZk and hence to BZ. The nitely additivity of  is then guaranteed by
that of each k. This also proves that BZ is a eld (viz. algebraic structure).
Now observe that  on BZ is continuous from above because for any set An 2 BZ it is
true that An # ;, such that (An) # 0 (Billingsley, 1995, Theorem 2.1).8 If  is a nitely
additive probability measure on the eld BZ, and if An # ; for sets An 2 BZ implies
(An) # 0, then  is countably additive. To see this dene B1 = A1 and Bn = AnnAn 1.
Then the Bn's are disjoint, An = [n
k=0Bk, and A1 = [1
k=0Bk. Z = A1 since Z is the largest
set in BZ. Indeed, if Z = [1
k=0Bk for disjoint sets Bk, then Cn = [1
k>nBk = Zn [n
k=0 Bk
lies in the eld BZ, and Cn # ;. The hypothesis, together with nite additivity, gives
(Z)  
Pn
k=0 (Bk) = (Cn) # 0, and hence (Z) =
P1
k=0 (Bk). This also proves that
(Z;BZ;) is a probability space.
We may now use Carath eodory's Lemma (Billingsley, 1995, Theorem 3.1) to extend the
probability measure  on the eld BZ uniquely to the generated Borel sigma-algebra (BZ).

Proof of Proposition 1. In Lemma 1, set Z0 = f;g and Zk =   [[
k 1
l=0 T l
0; i] for k  1, so
Z0  Z1  , Z0 [  [ Zk = Xk and [1
k=0Zk =   [[1
l=0T l
0; i]. A coherent innite step
type t1
i 2 T 1
1;i is exactly  2 ([1
k=0Zk). Lemma 1 thus implies that there exists a collection
T 1
1;i = (  [[1
l=0T0; i]). 
8By An # ; is meant An  An 1    A0 and \n0An = ;; (An) # 0 means that (An)  (An 1) 
  (A0) and (An) ! 0 (or limn!0 (An) = 0).
9Coherency implies that player i's step types determines i's beliefs over opponents' step
types in a meaningful way. But player i's step type does not necessarily determine i's belief
over opponents' beliefs over i's step types{in particular i might assign positive probability
to opponents' possible step 0 to k   1 types being incoherent. For a step type to determine
all step 0 to k  1 types of her opponents, mutual knowledge of coherency must be imposed.




















i is the subset of T k
1;i obtained by requiring that i's step k type knows (belief with
probability one) that opponents' step 0 to k   1 types are coherent, that i's step k type
knows that opponents' step 0 to k   1 types knows that i's own step 0 to k   2 types are
coherent, and so on. (Similar for  i.)
A question that often arises in the discussion of strategic situations is whether the infor-
mation structure is common knowledge. The observation we wish to make is that the neces-
sary rationality assumption made in strategic situations with stepwise thinking is not that of
common knowledge, but rather the `natural' assumption of stepwise mutual knowledge of co-
herency. To see this, consider, for example, the set T k
2;i = ftk






as dened above. The set T k
2;i is the set of step k types of player i that know that opponents'
step 0 to k   1 types are coherent. So T k
2;i is the set of step k types of player i which can
calculate beliefs about opponents' beliefs about i's own step 0 to k  2 types, that is the set
of step k types that know of opponents' information structure. Similarly, T k
3;i is the set of
step k types belonging to player i that can calculate beliefs about opponents' beliefs about
i's beliefs over opponents' step 0 to k   3, that is, the set of step k types that know that
opponents know of i's information structure, and so on in k inductive steps. The upshot is
that the information structure relevant for a step k type is guaranteed by the assumption of
mutual knowledge of coherency.





for all k  1;
T
k





Proof. From mutual knowledge of coherency we have that T k
i  T k
1;i. Since Proposition 1
10implies that T 1
1;i exists, T 1
i  T 1
1;i also exists. 
An obvious question to ask at this point is why the particular information structure
in Corollary 1 is a natural (or `canonical') description of stepwise thinking. The reason is
that the marginal probability assigned by t1
i to a given event in [k
l=0Xl
i is equal to the






i from tk, the measure t1
i preserves the probabilities specied by tk
i
for all k  0.
2.4 The universal belief space and belief closed subspaces
The structure developed in the previous subsections generated a set T 1
i of innite step types
into which the innite stepwise hierarchies of beliefs regarding the payo relevant parameters
can be embedded. We can rightfully deem the innite step type set `universal' if it contains
all possible hierarchies of possible stepwise hierarchies.





i for any k  0;
such that the belief system can rightfully be deemed universal T U
i for all i 2 N.
Proof. See Appendix.
The coherency assumption (Denition 1) ensures that there is one and only one way to
assign to any player of any step type tk
i a corresponding step type tU
i in T U
i so that the same
probability is assigned by tk
i and tU
i to the same event E  [[
k 1
l=0 T l
 i]. By denition the
universal belief space T U
i includes all possible beliefs over the payo relevant parameters in
the strategic situation as well as all the stepwise beliefs of opponents. That is, there exists
a stepwise thinking model that describes all the relevant information in a given strategic
situation with incomplete information, such that we can be condent that there is nothing
intrinsically restrictive about the structure of stepwise thinking.
In most applications we would however typically only consider some subset of the uni-
versal type space. A smaller set of step types which denes the strategic situation without
loss of generality is therefore needed, and for this purpose belief closed subsets are dened.
For example, in most applications of interest player i does not assign positive probabilities
to all points in [[1
l=0T l





 i]. Note that the niteness of [[
k 1
l=0 T l
 i] implies that tk
i must be a
11probability measure with nite support. Now let tk
i 2 Y k
i denote the set of all points player
i believes possible. Clearly all step types for which supp(tk
i) 6= ; are relevant, but this is not
all because some opponent j may not consider all points in [[
l 1
m=0T m
 j] (where 1 < l < k)
as possible, that is they may only consider possible points in supp(tl





j 2 Y l
j denote the set of all points opponent j belief possible. Similar for all other
opponents. This observation motivates the following denition:
Denition 2. A belief closed subspace is a closed subset Y k
i  T U
i for which each i 2 N,
any k  1, and all tk









A belief closed subspace is a closed subset of T U
i which is also closed under stepwise
beliefs. In any tk
i 2 Y k
i , it contains all the epistemic features which are relevant in the mind
of player i who thinks in step k. If tk
i = 2 Y k
i , then player i thinking in step k do not believe
that tk
i is possible, she does not belief that any of her opponents believes it is possible,
she does not believe that any of her opponents believes that their opponents believes it is
possible, and so on. Belief closed subsets implies that when we choose only to consider a
subset of players' step types, we also assumes that all beliefs that are relevant for each player
in a given strategic situation are included.
3 Cognitive limitations and unawareness
In this section the denitions necessary to talk about cognitive limitations are introduced
(3.1), and it is shown that a nontrivial notion of unawareness arises naturally in our denition
of such limitations (3.2).
3.1 States, events, and belief operators
A state species, for each player what she would do and believe if the state obtains. Note
the subjunctive conditional; stepwise thinking with incomplete information does not only
concern what actually happens, but also considers what could have happened in states that
did not actually occur. Let 
 be the set of states, every element ! 2 
 corresponds to a
complete description of all the relevant aspects of the strategic situation, including what
each player beliefs. The information structure on 
 is specied in terms of sigma-algebras.
Let B
 denote the Borel sigma-algebra on 
. Each subset E 2 B
 is an event; its negation
is denoted :E = 
nE.




I  N is a group of players and [1
l=0T l
I is the set of induced step types related to I. The
mapping I(!) = tk
I is the prole of step k types assigned to group I, when the state




I). For example, if I = fig then i(!) 2 (  [[
k 1
l=0 T l
 i]) denes i's beliefs about her
opponents' `limited cognitive' abilities (see Section 2), and 
 1
i (tk
i) denotes the event `the
step type of player i is tk
i'. Finally, let ' : 
 !  specify the payo relevant parameter
'(!) =  corresponding to any state !. We need to relate any event E  
 to any
event in our universal type space. Since it is assumed that i knows her own step type tk
i,
she will consider elements (;tk
 i) such that (;tk
i;tk
 i) 2 E. Slightly abusing notation let
E i = f('(!); i(!)) : ('(!);i(!); i(!)) 2 Eg denote the event E i  [[1
l=0T l
 i] that
correspond to the event E  
.
At state ! player i believes event E  
, conditional on observing i(!), with probability
i(!)(E i). Thus f! : i(!)(E i) = 1g is the event `i belief event E conditional on observing
i(!) at !.' We use belief operators to represent events about interactive beliefs:
Denition 3. For any i 2 N and some event E, the belief operator for i is dened by:
Bi(E) = f! : i(!)(E i) = 1g:
Clearly, Bi(E) 2 B
 is itself an event. Note also that Bi() satises monotonicity
[E  F implies Bi(E)  Bi(F)], conjecture [Bi(E \F) = Bi(E)\Bi(F)], and consistency
Bi(;) = ;.
3.2 Nontrivial unawareness
Players are in models with stepwise thinking assumed overcondent and limited in their
beliefs about their opponents{that is, players are in general unaware of opponents doing at
least as much thinking as themselves. We now consider whether the hierarchy of stepwise
thinking allows for a `nontrivial' notion of such unawareness. By nontrivial we mean that
the state space 
 can have states ! in which players do not know an event, and do not
know that they do not know. Dekel et al. (1998) show that standard state spaces allow only
for a trivial notion of unawareness. Namely, if a player is unaware of something then she
is unaware of everything and knows nothing. More generally, they show that no standard
state space can capture adequately the notion of unawareness.
We will in the following clarify why cognitive limitations are nontrivial. In other words,
why stepwise thinking models imply a nontrivial notion of unawareness of opponents doing
13at least as much thinking as herself. Intuitively, there exists events which are unmeasurable
in the mind of a stepwise thinker, these are events which demand that opponents do at least
as much thinking as the player (see Corollary 1). Formally, the set of states in which player
i is aware of E is given by an awareness operator:
Denition 4. For any i 2 N,  2 [0;1] and some event E, the awareness operator for i is
dened as:
Ai(E) = f! : i(!)(E i)  g:
It follows that Ai(E) 2 B
. A player is at ! aware of E if and only if her step type as
dened by ! is concentrated on a space in which the event is `expressible'. That is, a player
is aware of any event to which she can assign some probability. The unawareness operator
is naturally dened as the negation of awareness:
Denition 5. For any i 2 N and some event E, the unawareness operator for i is dened
as:
Ui(E) = :Ai(E):
Again, clearly Ui(E) 2 B
. By showing that the unawareness operator complies with
the properties that any appealing concept of unawareness should satisfy, as suggested by
Dekel et al. (1998), the following proposition shows that unawareness of opponents doing as
much or more thinking is nontrivial in stepwise thinking models.
Proposition 3. Let E be an event. In stepwise thinking the following properties of un-
awareness obtains:
(i) Plausibility: Ui(E)  :Bi(E) \ :Bi:Bi(E),
(ii) BU introspection: BiUi(E) = ;,
(iii) AU introspection: Ui(E)  UiUi(E).
(iv) Weak necessitation: :Ui(E)  Bi(
).
Proof. See Appendix.
Plausibility implies that a player is unaware of E if she does not have any beliefs about
E, and does not have any beliefs about not having any beliefs about E. BU introspection
14states that a player cannot have any beliefs about her own unawareness. AU introspection
is the property that if a player is unaware of an event E, then she must be unaware of being
unaware. Finally, weak necessitation says that if a player is not unaware of E, then she
knows any tautology involving E. The four properties together preclude unawareness in any
standard state space model. In other words, the state space of stepwise thinking models is
nonstandard. In particular, stepwise thinking rule out `strong' necessitation (Bi(
) = 
).
That is, a player in our state space does not need to be certain of all tautologies. This is
fundamental for stepwise thinking; a player need not to know the `true' state if it involves
opponents doing as much or more thinking as herself.
4 Bayesian games with stepwise thinking
The Bayesian Nash equilibrium has become a benchmark for the analysis of `standard games'
with incomplete information, this concept is now applied to the class of games with stepwise
thinking. First the main denitions are given (4.1), then it is shown how we can represent
our Bayesian games as a `random vector model' and a `prior lottery model' (4.2), we then
consider how we can analyze such models using the standard tools of game theory (4.3)-(4.4),
and nally an example is considered (4.5).
4.1 Strategic forms with stepwise thinking
A strategic form game with stepwise thinking consists of dierent layers of strategic form
step k games each describing the strategic situation at a step of thinking. We will say
that a step k type is conned to a step k game. Remember that a belief closed subset Y k
i
contains all the epistemic features which are relevant in the mind of player i who is thinking
in step k. This implies that if some player i is conned to a step l < k game, then because
of unawareness her belief closed subspace will be the same in any step k  l game (that
is, Y l
i = Y k
i ). Situations in which only nonstrategic players play against each other will
for obvious reasons be omitted. The nonstrategic step 0 types will however still be in the
beliefs of step k  1 types, since step 0 types actions inuence their expected payo. These
observations motivates the following denition:
Denition 6. A Bayesian game with stepwise thinking   is a nite ordered set of step k  1












15The notation Ai denotes the nite set of player i's actions; Y k
i is the (belief closed) set of
player i's step k types, each representing dierent information that player i can have in the




 i] ! R depends on the set
of action proles A =
Q
i2N Ai, player i's own step k types, and the step types of opponents
she is aware of.
4.2 Induced stepwise belief systems





 i), and can be derived from her `signal' i(!) at state ! 2 
. Remember that the
only information a player has about the payo relevant parameters  is given by i(!) = tk
i,
we can therefore without loss of generality impose that  is Y k
i -measurable. That is, there
is a mapping i : [1
k=0Y k
i !  which relates any step k type of player i to an element in .
















A system of induced beliefs is an array (pi(jtk
i))tk
i 2Y k
i for which: (i) the system is






i ) for all k  2, and (ii) for
player i of step k type the priors pi(jtm
i ) for m > k are undened. Note that by assuming
that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the payo relevant parameters and step
types, we restrict our intention to a smaller class of Bayesian models.
In dening the conditional probability pi(jtk
i) we took on an interim point of view. The
strategic situation was implicitly assumed to be analyzed at a stage subsequent to the player
knowing her step k type. That is, we rendered any prior stage meaningless. However, most
applications of incomplete information games assumes an ex ante point of view before the
player knows her type. In this view players have prior beliefs over a common set of types.
At the interim stage players are given their types, update their priors, and make appropriate
adjustments in their beliefs. This interpretation can however be misleading when players
think in steps; if a player has beliefs over all step k types ex ante she should also have beliefs
over all step k types interim, that is, after learning her own step k type (her own limited
ability to think about opponents' even more limited thinking).9
9The plausibility and justication of the ex ante versus the interim view of information models has
been extensively discussed in the literature, see Harsanyi (1967{68), Dekel and Gul (1997), Gul (1998), and
Aumann (1998).
16However, an array of conditional probabilities (pi(jtk
i))tk
i 2Y k
i can always be derived from












i = 1, tk
i  0 for all tk
i 2 Y k
i ) for each step of thinking. Such a `prior'
does not represent i's beliefs in a hypothetical ex ante stage, it is only a technical device
to express the belief pi(). If we moreover assume that these priors are the common for all
players, then p = pi for all i 2 N. In this case, a game with incomplete information simply
corresponds to a game with imperfect information about a ctitious chance move selecting
the vector of step types according to probability measure p. This is the so called `random
vector model' of the Bayesian game. The random vector model can also be interpreted as
a population model in which for each player/role i 2 N there is a population of potential
players characterized by the dierent step types. An actual player is drawn at random from
each population i to play the game. This is the `prior lottery model' of the Bayesian game.
The following two examples illustrate how the two most frequently used applied stepwise
thinking models{the level-k model (Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) and Nagel (1995)) and
the cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al. (2004)) are special cases of the `prior lottery
model' presented above. In both models it is typically assumed that there is no uncertainty
about the payo such that  is a singleton. We can therefore ease notation and let step k
types be identied by the corresponding k 2 N.
Example 1 (Level-k models). In level-k models step k types believe with probability one
that opponents are step k   1 thinkers, that is, p(k   1jk) = 1.
Example 2 (Cognitive Hierarchy models). In Cognitive Hierarchy models step k types




where  2 (N) is assumed to be a Poisson distribution.
4.3 Mixed strategies and expected payos
We interpret players' `plan of play' not as deterministic, but rather regulated by probabilistic
rules. Denoted by (Ai) the set of probability distributions over Ai and refer to the mapping
i : Y k
i ! (Ai) as a mixed strategy of player i of step k type. A mixed strategy i(aijtk
i)
for player i thus species the conditional probability that player i of step k type plays action
ai. Let A i =
Q
j6=i Ai be the set of action proles of opponents and  i : Y l
 i ! (A i)
be a mixed strategy prole of player i's opponents, where  i(a ijtl
 i) is the conditional
probability that opponents  i of step l types plays action prole a i.
The specication of nonstrategic players `plan of play' is key. It is often assumed that
any given player i think that nonstrategic opponents choose their actions uniformly, such
17that  i(a ijt0
 i) 2 U(A i). However, we do not here restrict ourselves to any interpretation
of how nonstrategic players behave, but instead leave it to applications.
We assume that the probability distribution p puts positive weight on each tk
i 2 Y k
i and
fully determines the probability distribution p(tl
 ijtk




 i] of opponents given her own step k type tk
i 2 Y k
i . The expected payo
























 i) is player i thinking in step k's mixed strategy about the action prole
a i of opponents tl
 i which induce payo ui(ai;a i;tk
i;t0
 i). Evaluating this term gives the
expected utility from the actions of opponents. However, player i thinking in step k does, in
general, not know the prole of opponents facing her and thus evaluates her expected utility
with respect to her beliefs p(tl
 ijtk
i).
4.4 Equilibrium and existence
Although a stepwise game is not a `standard game', the Bayesian Nash equilibrium concept
based on the notion of best response can be adapted yielding a solution concept.
Denition 7. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a stepwise thinking game   is a prole  2 
of strategies with the property that for every i 2 N, tk
i 2 Y k
i , Gk 2   we have






Thus, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a stepwise thinking game species a behavior for
each player which is a best response to what she believes is the behavior of her opponents,
that is, a best response to the mixed strategies of her opponents given his step type.
Proposition 4. There exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in each step k game Gk 2  .
Proof. See Appendix.
Step k types are unaware of opponents doing at least as much thinking as themselves and
do not consider these players when calculating their expected payos. However, step k types
are aware of opponents thinking in steps l < k and take these types in to account. When
18choosing an equilibrium mixed strategy a step k type who is conned to Gk thus maximizes
her expected payos based on the mixed strategies of opponents thinking in step l < k,
but does not consider the mixed strategies of opponents doing more thinking than her. An
equilibrium mixed strategy prole in a game with stepwise thinking   is thus a prole in
which step types who do more thinking x the equilibrium strategies of step types doing less
thinking, before they nd their own equilibrium strategy. The following proposition helps
clarify the existence of such an equilibrium mixed strategy prole.
Proposition 5. Consider any two step games Gl;Gk 2   where l < k. There exists an
equilibrium strategy prole  in Gk, in which step l types play their equilibrium strategies
in Gl and step k types play theirs in Gk.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition suggests a procedure for constructing a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
a game with stepwise thinking. We start with an equilibrium in the step 1 game, and
then extend it step-by-step to `higher' step games by taking the equilibrium strategies of
opponents in the respective `lower' step games as given. This formulation suggest a method
of nding a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a game with stepwise thinking: (i) First calculate
for each player thinking in step 1 the best response to the nonstrategic players thinking in
step 0, then (ii) extend it step-by-step to players thinking in higher steps by xing the best
response of players doing less thinking.
4.5 Example
Stepwise thinking and the solution concept just characterized is illustrated by the following
trivial example of a run on the bank (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). First we consider a `prior
lottery model' with complete information, and then extent it to a situation with asymmetric
information.
(i) Complete information
Let there be two (almost) equally sized populations of depositors A and B. Each depositor
is small in that her stake is negligible as a proportion of the whole. If a population of
depositors withdraws their money from the bank, then they obtain a guaranteed payo of
r > 0. If they leave their money in, and the other population of depositors leave their money
in as well, they get a payo of R, where r < R < 2r. But if they leave their money in, and
the other population depositors withdraws, then the bank will go bankrupt and they get a






Figure 1: Payo matrix
If this was a `standard game' it would have two equilibria: [In,In] and [Out,Out]. We
will however here be interested in a scenario in which population A thinks in one step and
population B in two, and each population is certain that the other thinks in one less step.10
For simplicity let the nonstrategic depositors choose their actions according to an uniform
distribution. The two populations chooses simultaneously.
First, assume that the actions of step 0 thinkers are perfectly correlated. Population A
believes that depositors in population B are nonstrategic. Depositors in A thus theorize that
depositors in B withdraw their money with probability 1
2 and stays in otherwise. Population
A therefore expects that the payo is r if they withdraw and R
2 if they stay in. Since
r > R
2, population A's best response is to withdraw their money. Population B believes
that depositors in A are thinking in step 1 and expect that they will withdraw their money.
The best response of population B is therefore to withdraw their money as well since r > 0.
That is, we have a run on the bank since [Out,Out] is the unique (inferior) equilibrium in
the game with stepwise thinking just described.
Now assume that the actions of step 0 thinkers are independent. This implies that de-
positors in B withdraw their money with probability 1
2n, where n is the number of depositors
in population B. It follows that r < (1   1
2n)R for n  2 such that depositors in A thinking
in step 1 expects that depositors in B thinking in step 0 stays in, and therefore choose to
stay in themselves. Foreseeing this line of events the depositors in B thinking in step 2 will
also stay in since R > r. The unique (superior) equilibrium is in this case [In,In].
Notice that the coordination on equilibrium is not determined only by the fundamentals
(money), nor is it determined by some payo irrelevant variable that has nothing to do
with the fundamentals (`sunspots'). Rather, what matters are depositors steps of thinking.
Especially, the beliefs of depositors in population A about the actions of the (in their mind)
nonstrategic depositors in B.
(ii) Asymmetric information
10Evidence of such level-k thinking between a population of step 1 and 2 types, in which step types
are certain that opponents think in one less step, has been found in many experiments (see, for example,
Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006).
20Now imagine that if the bank goes bankrupt, then there exists some institution which
can either do nothing or bail out the bank ( = fNothing, Bailoutg). If the bank is bailed
out, then the depositors who does not withdraw their money will get a payo of R instead
of zero. Assume for simplicity that population A, thinking in step 1, is uncertain about




population B, thinking in two steps, knows it will (Y 2
B = ft2
B[Bailout]g). The payos in each













Figure 2: Two payo relevant parameters:  = fNothing, Bailoutg
Consider again the situation in which the actions of step 0 thinkers are perfectly corre-






2 if they stay in. That is, if p(t0
Bjt1
A[Bailout]) > 2r
R   1 then the
depositors in population A will stay in, otherwise they will withdraw their money. Being
certain that the bailout is going to happen, the depositors in population B will always stay
in. The unique equilibrium is therefore [In,In] if p(t0
Bjt1
A[Bailout]) > 2r
R   1, and [Out,In]
otherwise.
Intuitively, a run on the bank can (in this simple example) be prevented if depositors
assigns a `high enough' probability to the bank being bailed out. That is, the higher the
payo is from staying in relative to withdrawing, the lower the probability of a bailout has
to be.
5 Conclusion
This paper introduced a general incomplete information framework for studying stepwise
thinking. The framework we considered was general enough to: (i) analyze players abilities
to predict opponents' behavior at the most fundamental level, (ii) cover payo relevant
uncertainty; and (iii) allow for the examination of situations involving stepwise thinking
separate from the solution concept.
Along the way it was also shown that there exists a coherent universal step type space
which contains all step types such that there is nothing intrinsically restrictive about the
21proposed structure. Such universality was obtained in the broadest and most natural setup,
that of probability (or measure) theory. The structure of stepwise thinking implied that
players were unaware of opponents doing at least as much thinking as themselves. Within this
structure, we could admit as much uncertainty as might seem appropriate in any situation,
by enlarging the set of step types which represents uncertainty about the payo relevant
parameters.
Onto this structure we appended the orthodox Bayesian Nash equilibrium concept. Be-
cause players are unaware of any situation involving opponents doing at least as much think-
ing as themselves, they believe that the game they are conned to is the `true' game. This
implies that there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy in the game with stepwise
thinking in which players in any step game x the equilibrium strategies of opponents, who
they believe do less thinking, and choose their own equilibrium strategy based on this belief.
This suggest a procedure for constructing an equilibrium; rst we have to nd an equilib-
rium in the step 0 game and then extend it step-by-step to `higher' step games by xing the
equilibrium strategies of opponents in the respective `lower' step games.
22A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
First note that T k
i  T 1




i). We need to show that it










i. We know from the proof of Proposition (5) that the Borel sigma-algebra on
[1
l=0Xl
i is well dened. Since the generated Borel sigma-algebra is the smallest algebra














i), such that beliefs are preserved. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
With slight abuse of notation we write Bi(E i), Ai(E i) and Ui(E i) for the events in the
step type space which corresponds to events Bi(E), Ai(E) and Ui(E), respectively, in the
state space. For example, Bi(E i) = f('(!); i(!)) : ('(!);i(!); i(!)) 2 Bi(E)g. Now
to the proofs of the four properties:
(i) Plausibility: This property is equivalent to Bi(E)[Bi:Bi(E)  Ai(E). By Denition
3 and 4 we have that Bi(E)  Ai(E). To see that Bi:Bi(E)  Ai(E), note that
! 2 Bi:Bi(E) i i(!)(:Bi(E i)) = 1. This implies that :Bi(E)  Ai(E). Hence
! 2 Ai(E).
(ii) BU introspection: BiUi(E) = ;. To see that this is true consider that some ! 2
BiUi(E) i i(!)(Ui(E i)) = 1, which can only be true if Ui(E)  Ai(E). By
Denition 5 this is impossible and ! = 2 BiUi(E).
(iii) AU introspection: Ui(E)  UiUi(E) is equivalent to AiUi(E) = Ai(E). Then ! 2
AiUi(E) i i(!)(Ui(E i))  . Hence ! 2 AiUi(E) i ! 2 Ai(E) by Denition 4.
(iv) Weak necessitation: :Ui(E)  Bi(
) is equivalent to Ai(E)  Bi(
). ! 2 Ai(E) i
i(!)(E i)   (Denition 4), and ! 2 Bi(
) i i(!)(  [[1
l=0T l
 i]) = 1 (Denition
3). Since E i  [[1
l=0T l
 i] and   1 (awareness if a weaker condition than belief)
then it hold true that ! 2 Ai(E) i ! 2 Bi(
). 
23A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4 follows naturally from the following Theorem:
Theorem 1 (Kakutani, 1941). If D is a nonempty compact and convex subset of Euclidean
space, and  is an upper hemicontinuous, nonempty, and convex valued correspondence
 : D ! D, then  has a xed point, that is, there is a d 2 D such that d 2 (d).




















i ;i 2 ig: (6)
(A) is by denition a nonempty compact and convex subset of Euclidean space. k()
is upper hemicontinuous because Etk
i [uij] is continuous for each (nite) tk
i 2 Y k
i and
i 2 N, nonempty since each Etk
i [uij] is continuous and (A) is compact, and convex
valued because each Etk
i [uij] is quasi-concave on (A) (k
i (




i [uij] for each tk
i 2 T k
i g). Therefore, by Theorem 1, k() has a xed point, that is,
there is some  2 k(). By denition,  is a xed point of k() i it is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in Gk 2  . 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
We need to show that  is an equilibrium strategy prole in  k in which step l < k types
play their equilibrium strategies in  l and step k types play theirs in  k. Suppose not, then













i ,  2 fl;kg and i 2 N.
(i) For  = k, a player's strategy i is not an equilibrium strategy in  k by Denition 7{a
contradiction.
(ii) For  = l, since a player's expected payo is (due to unawareness) identical in  l and
 k, her strategy i is not an equilibrium strategy in  l by Denition 7{a contradiction.
Hence  must be an equilibrium strategy prole in  k. 
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